questions about ceo compensation

1.evidence from uk ,an early adpoter of non-binding compulsory voting in 2003,suggest shareholder overwhelming back mangers most of time,although perhaps less so for those already close to the top pf the rewards distribution. rejecting pay resolution is unusual and seems to follow widespread adverse publicity . why it cause the adverse publicity and do above nomral ‘ no’ votes as signal?

2. if the ceo contract is simply a matter of resolving an agency problem ,should others be concerned ? is interest in other’s pay merely envy?

3.has socity an interest in efficient arrangements?

4.does increasing ceo pay indicate a particular skill shortage?

5.does high exec pay generat discontent?

6.in non-performing executives receive big servance pay-offs, is the incentive effect of performance pay weakened?

7.why sometimes it say rewards for failure when talking about ceo pay, what does this mean ?

8.”problem that the firm needs a quick clean break and making public criticisms can damage sharehoder’ interest. therefore ceo often leave y mutual consent(compensation is generally conditional on singning a non-disclousure agreenment .so the truth may be hidden) “I dont understand here what does quick clean break and the point he try to make here is what ?

9. rent capture point to much lower slaray diferentials in .say japan or scandinavia compared to say,usa or uk. point to generous pay-offs for failure,

what is the point here, i didnt get

10 talking about superstars and zipf’s law with ceo pay , why mention zipf’s law here

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Question One

Most of the times, the shareholders overwhelmingly vote in agreement with increasing the salary of its top management. However, investors have started diverting for the trend and are now not willing to vote in accord with pay increases. The reason behind the change is because of the non-performance or dismal performance of the company. The pay may also be excessive according to the perception of the shareholders.

(879 words)